Abstract

Payment Tracking System is a web-based application for tracking and managing the payments for various vendors. It provides a single point of contact that consolidates payment requests from the accounts department to the top management to deliver the supplier payments on time, using integrated best practices to manage operations and services. It offers integrated Transaction Management capabilities like Ledger view and Hold/Release Payments. It ensures visibility, insight, isolation and faster resolution of Payment related issues for any type of organization by providing the right information at the right time as required by the user. For both models, we design incentive resource allocation mechanisms to maximize the social welfare. Theoretically analysis shows that the proposed mechanisms are truthful for general monotonic pro?t functions and the worst-case performance on the social welfare are well-bounded within a constant factor of the optimal solution for linear pro?t functions. Simulation results also demonstrate that the performances of the proposed mechanisms are very close to the optimal solution, in terms of maximizing the social welfare.

Keywords

Payment, Incentives, Approximation, Cloud computing, Resource allocation,

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